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FLORIDA’S “BRAVE NEW WORLD”: THE TRANSITION FROM FRYE 
TO DAUBERT WILL TRANSFORM THE PLAYING-FIELD FOR 
LITIGANTS IN MEDICAL CAUSATION CASES 
Erica W. Rutner and Lara Bueso Bach* 
For nearly a century, Florida followed the Frye1 standard for admissibility of 
expert testimony. However, on June 4, 2013, Florida Governor Rick Scott signed 
into law House Bill 7015, amending Florida Statute section 90.702, and 
transforming Florida into a Daubert jurisdiction. After a number of failed attempts, 
Florida lawmakers finally succeeded in aligning Florida’s standards for expert 
admissibility with the standards that govern in federal court and many states around 
the country.2 
While the transition from Frye to Daubert will undoubtedly impact all cases 
utilizing expert testimony, as this article discusses, litigants relying on medical 
causation testimony are likely to encounter some of the most significant changes. 
That is because under Frye, Florida applied one of the most liberal admissibility 
standards to medical causation testimony, essentially allowing for the admission of 
this type of testimony without any judicial oversight.3 In contrast, Daubert requires 
courts to act as “gatekeepers” in every case by independently assessing the 
scientific reliability of the methodology, reasoning, and extrapolations underlying 
an expert’s opinion.4 This article focuses on how these new standards, as 
articulated by amended Florida Statute section 90.702 and applicable Supreme 
Court precedent, will require far more rigorous scrutiny of medical causation 
opinions than has traditionally been the case in Florida. Because Florida courts 
have looked to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals for guidance in the past when 
state and federal law are identical, this article also discusses the stringent criteria 
the Eleventh Circuit has imposed under Daubert with respect to medical causation 
opinions, and in particular, the types of data and methodologies it has deemed to be 
 ________________________  
 * Erica W. Rutner is a complex commercial litigation associate at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP. Erica 
received a B.A. summa cum laude from Barnard College in 2006, and a J.D. summa cum laude from the 
University of Miami in 2009. Lara Bueso Bach is a complex commercial litigation associate at Weil, Gotshal & 
Manges LLP. Lara received a B.A. summa cum laude from Rollins College in 2007, and a J.D. from the University 
of Michigan Law School in 2010. 
 1. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 2. At the beginning of 2013, Florida was one of only ten remaining states still applying the Frye standard. 
The other states that still apply Frye include: California, District of Columbia, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland, 
Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington. 
 3. See Stephen E. Mahle, The “Pure Opinion” Exception to the Florida Frye Standard, 86 FLA. B.J. 41, 
41 (2012). 
 4. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–92 (1993). 
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reliable—and unreliable—as a basis for inferring general causation.5 As the article 
concludes, litigants across the state who rely on medical causation testimony 
should be prepared to face a “brave new world”6 in preparing their cases and 
defending their claims, especially because Daubert decisions in medical causation 
cases are often dispositive. 
I.  THE FLORIDA LEGISLATURE ADOPTS THE STANDARDS DELINEATED IN 
DAUBERT AND ITS PROGENY WITH RESPECT TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF 
EXPERT TESTIMONY 
Frye requires that the scientific principles and methodology underlying an 
expert’s testimony be generally accepted in the scientific community.7 House Bill 
7015 explicitly rejects Frye and instead adopts the standards outlined in Daubert 
and Federal Rule of Evidence 702.8 Specifically, the revisions to Florida Statute 
section 90.702 effectuated by House Bill 7015 now require courts to ensure that: 
(1)  expert testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; 
(2) expert testimony is the result of reliable principles and 
methods; and 
(3) the expert witness has applied the principles and methods 
reliably to the facts of the case.9 
While revised Florida Statute section 90.702 does not itself mention Daubert; 
House Bill 7015 explicitly states that by amending the statute to pattern it after 
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as amended in 2000, “the Florida 
Legislature intends to adopt the standards for expert testimony in the courts of this 
state as provided in”10 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,11 General 
Electric Co. v. Joiner,12 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.13 House Bill 7015 
further provides that the Florida Legislature “no longer [intends to] apply the 
standard in Frye v. United States, in the courts of this state.”14 Thus, pursuant to the 
express mandates of House Bill 7015, the various principles outlined in Daubert 
and its progeny should now govern the admission of expert testimony under 
Florida law. 
 ________________________  
 5. General causation refers to “the question of whether the drug or chemical can, in general, cause the 
harm plaintiff alleges,” whereas specific causation focuses on “whether the chemical caused the plaintiff’s specific 
injury.” Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1196 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 6. Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, on remand, described the new Daubert standard as 
a “Brave New World.” Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 7. See Castillo v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 854 So. 2d 1264, 1268 (Fla. 2003). 
 8. See H.B. 7015, 2013 Leg., 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013). 
 9. FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (2013). 
 10. H.B. 7015, 2013 Leg., 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013). 
 11. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 12. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 13. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 14. H.B. 7015, 2013 Leg., 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013) (citation omitted). 
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II.  THE APPLICATION OF REVISED FLORIDA STATUTE SECTION 90.702 IN 
FLORIDA COURTS  
While the Florida Legislature may have amended Florida Statute section 
90.702, it is the Florida Supreme Court that is vested with the authority to adopt 
rules of practice and procedure for the courts in Florida.15 The Florida Supreme 
Court has yet to explicitly adopt the amendments;16 however, it appears that it 
implicitly adopted the changes in Davis v. State17 and Perez v. Bell South 
Telecommunications.18 Despite this implicit adoption of the changed rule, the 
Florida Supreme Court has still not provided any guidance as to how Daubert 
should be interpreted or applied. Nevertheless, Florida appellate and trial courts 
have regularly begun to apply Daubert.19 Indeed, since the amended statute went 
into effect, no published lower court decision has applied the Frye standard. 
Instead, for example, in both Conley v. State and Perez v. Bell South 
Telecommunications, the Florida appellate courts held that Daubert should apply to 
expert testimony previously subject to a Frye analysis because the Florida 
Legislature had adopted the Daubert standard during the pending appeal.20 The 
Perez court reasoned that it “take[s] comfort . . . in the fact that the Florida 
Supreme Court periodically adopts all legislative changes to the Florida Evidence 
Code to the extent they are procedural.”21 
While Conley remanded the case and ordered the trial court to apply Daubert, 
the court in Perez took it upon itself to analyze and apply Daubert to the facts of 
the case.22 Specifically, the court addressed the admissibility of the plaintiff’s 
expert who sought to testify, based on his personal opinion, that the stress the 
plaintiff experienced in the workplace caused her placental abruption and early 
delivery of her child.23 The plaintiff argued that the testimony, which was excluded 
by the lower court under Frye, should have been admitted under the “pure opinion” 
exception espoused in Marsh (described in more detail in Section III, infra).24 The 
court, however, rejected the plaintiff’s pure opinion argument and found that this 
exception no longer applies in Florida,25 emphasizing that the “legislative purpose 
 ________________________  
 15. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a). 
 16. Notably, the Florida Supreme Court has stricken the references to Frye in the Florida Rules of Juvenile 
Procedure. See In re Amendments to Fla. Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 123 So. 3d 1128, 1130 (Fla. 2013). 
 17. Davis v. State, 142 So. 3d 867, 871–72 (Fla. 2014) (discussing revised section 90.702). 
 18. Perez v. Bell S. Telecomms. Inc., No. SC14–1029, 2014 WL 5314497, at *1 (Fla. Oct. 16, 2014) 
(declining jurisdiction over a case in which petitioner argued that the Third District Court of Appeal improperly 
applied the Daubert standard); see also Zakrzewski v. State, No. SC13–1825, 2014 WL 2810560, at *1 (Fla. June 
20, 2014) (holding that the Daubert standard should not be retroactively applied to the admissibility of the expert 
testimony proffered during a proceeding that occurred nearly two decades ago). 
 19. See Perez v. Bell S. Telecomms. Inc., 138 So. 3d 492, 497–99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Conley v. 
State, 129 So. 3d 1120, 1121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013); Booker v. Sumter Cnty. Sherriff’s Office, 166 So. 3d 189, 
194–95 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); Giamo v. Fla. Autosport, Inc., 154 So. 3d 385, 387–89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2014). 
 20. See Conley, 129 So. 3d at 1121; Perez, 138 So. 3d at 498. 
 21. Perez, 138 So. 3d at 498 n.12 (citation omitted). 
 22. See cases cited supra note 19. 
 23. Perez, 138 So. 3d at 494–95. 
 24. Id. at 496. 
 25. Id. at 497. 
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of the new law is clear: to tighten the rules for admissibility of expert testimony in 
the courts of this state.”26 The court also explicitly relied on Eleventh Circuit case 
law in finding that the expert’s opinion was merely his own personal opinion and 
was not supported by any credible scientific research.27 Specifically, he had “never 
before related a placental abruption to workplace stress and knew of no one who 
had. There is no scientific support for this opinion. The opinion he proffers is a 
classic example of the common fallacy of assuming causality from temporal 
sequence.”28 
Thus, it is clear that Florida appellate courts intend to apply Daubert pursuant 
to the mandates of Florida Statute section 90.702, and they are likely to seek 
guidance from Eleventh Circuit case law in doing so. Indeed, because the 
amendments to Florida Statute section 90.702 are explicitly patterned after Daubert 
and Federal Rule of Evidence 702, Florida courts are likely to rely on federal 
courts, and the Eleventh Circuit in particular for guidance.29 As one Florida 
appellate court put it, Florida courts have found it beneficial “to accord unusual 
weight to a decision on [an] issue, if there is one, of the federal circuit in which the 
state is located”30 because this “approach has the virtue of establishing that the 
issue will be uniformly decided by both federal and state courts in the geographic 
area in which the state is located; thus discouraging forum shopping.”31 Given this 
preference, the remainder of the article focuses on the contrast between the liberal 
admissibility standards that have traditionally applied in Florida with respect to 
medical causation experts and the more rigorous standards that are now likely to 
apply, as well as the Eleventh Circuit’s application of those principles in the 
context of medical causation testimony. 
III.  THE COURT’S ROLE IN ASSESSING MEDICAL CAUSATION TESTIMONY 
WILL BE TRANSFORMED UNDER DAUBERT AND SUBSEQUENT SUPREME COURT 
PRECEDENT 
The transition to Daubert will undoubtedly change the landscape of medical 
causation testimony. As the Ninth Circuit explained in Daubert II, “judges ruling 
on the admissibility of expert scientific testimony face a far more complex and 
daunting task in a post-Daubert world than before.”32 At its most basic level, 
Daubert no longer considers “general acceptance” the relevant inquiry in 
determining the admissibility of an expert’s opinion.33 Rather, Daubert focuses on 
 ________________________  
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 499. 
 28. Id. (citing McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1243 (11th Cir. 2005)). 
 29. See Ward v. Atl. Sec. Bank, 777 So. 2d 1144, 1147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (where state law is 
“nearly identical” to federal law, “Florida courts will look to interpretations of the federal . . . law for guidance in 
interpreting Florida’s . . . laws”); Phenion Dev. Grp., Inc. v. Love, 940 So. 2d 1179, 1184 n.5 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2006); see also Perez v. Bell S. Telecomms., Inc., 138 So. 3d 492, 499 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Eleventh 
Circuit precedent in excluding plaintiff’s expert under Daubert). 
 30. Wylie v. Inv. Mgmt. & Research, 629 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 33. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993). 
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the reliability underlying an expert’s methodology: “the trial judge must ensure that 
[expert testimony] is not only relevant, but reliable;” which entails “a preliminary 
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is 
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be 
applied to the facts in issue.”34  
Although the Florida Supreme Court has described Daubert as “a more lenient 
standard” than Frye,35 the exact opposite is true when it comes to Florida’s 
application of Frye in the context of medical causation testimony.36 Indeed, over 
the last decade, the Florida Supreme Court has adopted an increasingly lenient 
application of Frye as it pertains to medical causation testimony, amounting to 
what some have described as a “let it all in standard.”37 However, as the Florida 
appellate court in Perez noted, the transition to Daubert will “tighten the rules for 
admissibility of expert testimony in the courts of this state.”38 As discussed below, 
there are several reasons Daubert requires far greater scrutiny from judges in 
assessing medical causation testimony, which is likely to result in greater 
exclusions of causation experts than has traditionally been the case. 
A. Under Daubert, Courts Must Act as “Gatekeepers” with Respect to All 
Medical Causation Testimony 
According to the Florida Supreme Court, judges were not required to conduct a 
Frye analysis “in the vast majority of cases” because Frye “only applies when an 
expert attempts to render an opinion based upon new or novel scientific 
techniques.”39 This principle ultimately became the basis for the effective 
abdication of judicial oversight with respect to medical causation testimony.40 
Specifically, in Marsh v. Valyou,41 the court held that “an ordinary opinion on 
medical causation [is not] a new or novel principle subject to Frye.” Instead, such 
testimony is subject to the “pure opinion” exception to the Frye standard, which 
provides that Frye is inapplicable to testimony that relies only on the expert’s 
 ________________________  
 34. Id. at 590–93. 
 35. Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1997). 
 36. See id. at 271–72. 
 37. See Mahle, supra note 3, at 43 (“A complete analysis of Frye and Daubert consumes volumes, but 
positioning the [pure opinion exception] in the legal landscape reveals the fact that the [exception] constitutes a 
large hole in the Frye standard, which further weakens the already lax Frye test.”). As another commentator put it:  
In cases where a plaintiff needs the help of “junk science,” it is all too common for a Florida 
resident, be it an individual or company, to be sued in a matter that chiefly involves an out-
of-state defendant primarily for the reason that the plaintiff’s attorney wants to prevent the 
case from being removed to federal court because of a preference for Frye, which is 
equivalent to no standard at all over Daubert. 
Kenneth W. Waterway, A Plea for Legislative Reform: The Adoption of Daubert to Ensure the Reliability of Expert 
Evidence in Florida Courts, 36 NOVA L. REV. 1 (2011).  
 38. Perez v. Bell S. Telecomms., Inc., 138 So. 3d 492, 497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).  
 39. U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So. 2d 104, 109 (Fla. 2002) (emphasis added). 
 40. See Mahle, supra note 3, at 44. 
 41. Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 548 (Fla. 2007). 
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personal experience and training.42 As the Marsh court reasoned, “experts routinely 
form medical causation opinions based on their experience and training.”43 
Notably, the Marsh court held that the testimony in that case, which causally linked 
trauma to fibromyalgia, was not subject to any Frye analysis despite the fact that 
“the precise etiology of fibromyalgia may not be fully understood,” and, as the 
dissent pointed out, “the underlying theory of general causation is not accepted.”44 
In fact, federal courts around the country have excluded similar expert testimony 
linking trauma to fibromyalgia.45 
In the wake of Marsh, Florida courts routinely applied the “pure opinion” 
exception to abdicate any Frye analysis of the underlying basis for an expert’s 
medical causation opinion, particularly in cases where the plaintiff’s causal theory 
was still under investigation.46 For instance, in Andries v. Royal Caribbean 
Cruises, Ltd., the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida admitted medical 
causation expert testimony, based solely on the expert’s clinical observations—
despite the fact that the precise etiology of the disease at issue was unknown—on 
the basis that “Marsh does not require scientific literature or other proof regarding 
the precise etiology. . . . The fact that the precise causation is still under 
investigation does not make the expert’s opinions in this case ‘new or novel.’”47 
The court in Hood v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. did the same, holding that an expert’s 
opinion that Zicam caused the plaintiff to lose his sense of smell—which had been 
uniformly rejected by federal courts across the country—was “pure opinion” that 
was not subject to any Frye analysis.48 
In contrast with this particularly lenient approach, the Daubert standard 
requires courts to act as “gatekeepers” in all cases with respect to all expert 
 ________________________  
 42. See id. The pure opinion exception was first described by the Florida Supreme Court in Flanagan v. 
State, which noted that “pure opinion testimony, such as an expert’s opinion that a defendant is incompetent, does 
not have to meet Frye, because this type of testimony is based on the expert’s personal experience and training.” 
Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993). 
 43. Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 548. 
 44. Id. at 550–62. The court also concluded that even if Frye were to apply, the testimony would still be 
admissible because “numerous published articles and studies recognize an association between trauma and 
fibromyalgia,” despite a “lack of studies conclusively demonstrating a causal link.” Id. at 550. See also infra 
Section IV(B)(1) (discussing the admissibility of opinions based on associations).  
 45. See, e.g., Vargas v. Lee, 317 F.3d 498 (5th Cir. 2003): 
We conclude that the admission of [the expert’s] testimony was an abuse of discretion. We 
do not, however, purport to hold that trauma does not cause fibromyalgia syndrome or that 
the admission of expert testimony on that subject is permanently foreclosed. Medical 
science may someday determine with sufficient reliability that such a causal relationship 
exists. As the Supreme Court recognized in Daubert: “[I]n practice, a gatekeeping role for 
the judge, no matter how flexible, inevitably on occasion will prevent the jury from learning 
of authentic insights and innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance that is struck by 
Rules of Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but for 
the particularized resolution of legal disputes.” 
Id. at 502 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)). 
 46. See Andries v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 12 So. 3d 260, 263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Hood v. 
Matrixx, Initiatives, Inc., 50 So. 3d 1166, 1175–76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. 
Thorne, 110 So. 3d 66, 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). 
 47. Andries, 12 So. 3d at 263–65. 
 48. Hood, 50 So. 3d at 1175–76; Thorne, 110 So. 3d at 72. 
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testimony.49 As the United States Supreme Court held in Kumho, Daubert 
“imposes a special obligation upon a trial judge to ensure that any and all scientific 
testimony . . . is not only relevant, but reliable . . . . [T]his basic gatekeeping 
obligation applies . . . to all expert testimony.”50 In fact, consistent with this 
principle, House Bill 7015 expressly abolishes the “pure opinion” exception to 
expert testimony delineated in Marsh.51 Thus, the transition to Daubert will now 
require Florida courts to assess the admissibility of all medical causation opinions 
more rigorously in all cases. 
B. Under Daubert, an Expert’s Opinion Must Be Based on More Than 
Experience and Training  
While Florida courts are expressly prohibited from applying the “pure opinion” 
exception, it is clear that they also may not rely on the underlying basis for that 
exception—i.e., an expert’s experience and training—as sufficient for admitting a 
medical causation opinion under Daubert.52 Pursuant to the mandates of Daubert, 
“[t]he subject of an expert’s testimony must be ‘scientific knowledge’ [which] 
implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science [and which] 
connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”53 The Supreme 
Court went on to explain that “[i]n order to qualify as ‘scientific knowledge,’ an 
inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific method. Proposed 
testimony must be supported by appropriate validation—i.e., ‘good grounds,’ based 
on what is known.”54 
To determine whether a specific methodology constitutes reliable “scientific 
knowledge,” and is therefore admissible, the United States Supreme Court 
suggested a non-exclusive list of relevant factors to consider, including: (1) 
whether the expert’s theory can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory has 
been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of 
error of the particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the technique is 
generally accepted in the scientific community.55 As the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals noted in Daubert II, “something doesn’t become ‘scientific knowledge’ 
just because it’s uttered by a scientist.”56 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court 
in Kumho specifically reinforced the fact that, at all times, the district court must 
 ________________________  
 49. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. 
 50. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (emphasis added). 
 51. H.B. 7015 states that “by amending s. 90.702, Florida Statutes, the Florida Legislature intends to 
prohibit in the courts of this state pure opinion testimony as provided in Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 
2007).” H.B. 7015, 2013 Leg., 115th Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013) (emphasis added). 
 52. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See id. at 593–94. Note that this is not to be construed as “a definitive checklist or test” because the 
Daubert inquiry is a “flexible” one. Id. 
 56. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis 
added); see also Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1316–13 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Under the regime of 
Daubert, a district judge asked to admit scientific evidence must determine whether the evidence is genuinely 
scientific, as distinct from being unscientific speculation offered by a genuine scientist.”). 
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determine the reliability of an expert’s opinion, not merely the qualifications of the 
expert who offers the opinion.57 In doing so, the court must “make certain that an 
expert . . . employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that 
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.”58 
C. Under Daubert, Courts Must Assess an Expert’s Application of a 
Particular Methodology and Any Deductions or Extrapolations Made by 
the Expert 
Even as to those medical causation opinions to which Frye would apply, 
Florida’s old regime left judges extremely limited in the type of assessment they 
could conduct. Specifically, the Florida Supreme Court explained in U.S. Sugar 
Corp. v. Henson, that Frye’s requirement of general acceptance only applied to the 
general methodologies on which an expert relied, and that an “expert’s deductions 
based thereon and opinions [do not need to be] generally accepted as well.”59 In 
fact, the court “explicitly disapproved” any notion that the “opinion and deduction 
themselves, must be generally accepted as a predicate for admissibility.”60 Thus, 
the court held admissible medical causation testimony simply because the toxicity 
of the agent at issue was generally accepted, without any inquiry as to the validity 
of the deductions the expert made in opining that the agent was capable of causing 
the plaintiff’s specific disease.61 
In Castillo v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.,62 the Florida Supreme Court 
further narrowed the permitted assessment of medical causation testimony, holding 
that the lower court “went beyond the requirements of Frye” by considering the 
experts’ “extrapolation of the data from . . . admittedly acceptable experiments” 
and their “application of the data generated from that science in reaching [their] 
ultimate conclusion.”63 Instead, the Florida Supreme Court accepted the plaintiff’s 
experts’ reliance on and extrapolation from in-vitro and animal studies simply 
because those are “commonly accepted” scientific studies and methodologies—
without any assessment of the experts’ methods of applying and extrapolating the 
data to reach their final causation conclusion.64  
This approach stands in stark contrast to amended Florida Statute section 
90.702 and United States Supreme Court precedent, which mandates that a court 
 ________________________  
 57. See, e.g., Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999); see also Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. 
Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002) (in Kumho, the United States Supreme Court made it clear that 
testimony based solely on the experience of an expert would not be admissible). 
 58. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152. Notably, the 11th Circuit has expressly enforced this principle in the context 
of medical causation testimony, holding that “clinical experience, used alone . . . [is] insufficient to show general 
causation.” Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1201 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Wilson v. Taser 
Int’l, Inc., 303 F. App’x 708, 714 (11th Cir. 2008) (“A medical degree does not authorize [an expert] to testify [on 
causation] when he does not base his methods on valid science.”). 
 59. U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So. 2d 104, 110 (Fla. 2002). 
 60. Id. at 110. 
 61. See id. at 109–10. 
 62. Castillo v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 854 So. 2d 1264, 1276 (Fla. 2003). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.; see also infra Section IV(B)(6) (discussing the admissibility of an opinion based on animal 
studies). 
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assess an expert’s application of a particular methodology.65 Amended Florida 
Statute section 90.702 expressly requires courts to ensure that the expert “has 
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.” Daubert 
requires the same, noting that a court must do “a preliminary assessment of 
whether the [expert’s] reasoning or methodology . . . properly can be applied to the 
facts in issue.”66 Indeed, this principle is so fundamental to the Court’s assessment 
that it formed the basis for the holdings in both Kumho and Joiner.67 Specifically, 
in Kumho, the United States Supreme Court held that the issue before the trial court 
was “not the reasonableness in general” of a particular methodology; “[r]ather, it 
was the reasonableness of using such an approach . . . to draw a conclusion 
regarding the particular matter to which the expert testimony was directly 
relevant.”68 Thus, the Kumho Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the 
expert’s opinions were sufficiently reliable simply because he had employed a 
visual inspection method that is used by other experts; emphasizing that “the 
question before the trial court was specific, not general . . . . [t]he particular issue in 
this case concerned the use of [the inspection method] to draw” the particular 
conclusions reached by the expert.69 
The United States Supreme Court went even further in Joiner, holding that 
courts must assess the extrapolations an expert makes in reaching his or her 
conclusions:  
[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one 
another. Trained experts commonly extrapolate from existing data. 
But nothing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence 
requires a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected 
to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may 
conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between 
the data and the opinion proffered.70   
Consistent with this principle, the Joiner Court conducted the precise type of 
analysis of medical causation testimony that the Florida Supreme Court had 
foreclosed under Frye. Specifically, in addressing expert testimony causally linking 
PCB exposure to cancer, the Court held that whether the types of studies relied on 
by the plaintiff’s expert “can ever be a proper foundation for an expert’s opinion 
was not the issue. The issue was whether these experts’ opinions were sufficiently 
supported by the [specific] studies on which they purported to rely.”71 Thus, in 
 ________________________  
 65. See FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (repealed 2014). 
 66. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993) (emphasis added); see also FLA. 
STAT. § 90.702 (an expert witness may testify if “[t]he witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to 
the facts of the case”). 
 67. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 
145 (1997).  
 68. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 153. 
 69. Id. at 156–57. 
 70. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 145. 
 71. Id. at 144 (emphasis added). 
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contrast with the court in Castillo—which accepted the plaintiff’s experts’ reliance 
on and extrapolation from in-vitro and animal studies simply because those are 
“commonly accepted” scientific studies and methodologies—the Court in Joiner 
specifically assessed the experts’ extrapolations from the studies on which they 
relied (which included animal studies) and ultimately concluded that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the experts’ extrapolations could 
not reliably support their causation conclusions.72 
IV.  TO THE EXTENT ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT IS PERSUASIVE, THE 
RELIABILITY OF A MEDICAL CAUSATION OPINION DEPENDS ON THE TYPES OF 
EVIDENCE ON WHICH THE EXPERT RELIES 
In addition to the Supreme Court precedent outlined above, Florida courts—
like the Third District Court of Appeal in Perez—are likely to find persuasive the 
well-developed body of Eleventh Circuit case law that has applied Daubert to 
medical causation expert testimony. Specifically, because experts must employ the 
same intellectual rigor that scientists in the field employ when investigating a 
causal link between an agent and a disease, the Eleventh Circuit has found that 
certain types of evidence can form the basis for a reliable causation opinion while 
other types of evidence cannot.73 Many of these types of evidence are well 
described in the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, which is the leading 
reference source for federal judges in issues involving scientific testimony.74 To the 
extent Florida courts look to the Eleventh Circuit for guidance, it is critical that 
plaintiffs seeking to offer medical causation testimony heed these guidelines in 
order to withstand the heightened statutory standard. 
A. Scientifically Reliable Methods for Establishing Causation 
1. Epidemiological Studies 
The Eleventh Circuit has held that epidemiological studies are “the best 
evidence of causation in toxic tort actions” and are, therefore, a scientifically 
reliable method for establishing general causation.75 Epidemiological studies (such 
as case control studies, cohort studies, and cross-sectional studies) have designs 
 ________________________  
 72. Id. 
 73. Note that the Eleventh Circuit recognizes that toxic tort cases fall into two categories: (1) cases in 
which the medical community generally recognizes the toxicity of the drug or chemical at issue; and (2) cases in 
which the medical community does not. McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005). 
The first category—with respect to which a court need not undertake an exacting Daubert analysis—is very 
narrow, limited to situations “where the reliability of an expert’s methods is properly taken for granted,” and 
“medical doctors routinely and widely recognize [causation] as true, like cigarette smoking causes lung cancer and 
heart disease, too much alcohol causes cirrhosis of the liver, and that the ingestion of sufficient amounts of arsenic 
causes death.” Id. at 1239 n.5. 
 74. Barbara J. Rothstein & Ralph J. Cicerone, Forward to REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, 
at ix (3d ed. 2011). 
 75. Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. 
Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1197–98 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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and controls that allow an expert to determine whether there is an increased 
association between an agent and a disease.76 It must be emphasized, however, that 
when epidemiological studies do not yield “statistically significant results,”77 they 
may not supply an adequate foundation for a causation opinion.78 Moreover, in 
order to be admissible, an expert must explain “how the findings of those studies 
may be reliably connected to the facts of the particular case.”79 
As an example, in Rider v. Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., none of the four 
epidemiological studies presented by plaintiffs contained statistically significant 
results linking Parlodel to stroke.80 In the absence of statistically significant 
epidemiological studies, the court demanded alternative proof of medical 
causation.81 But as discussed infra, the remaining evidence the plaintiff 
presented—case reports, animal studies, FDA findings, and 
dechallenge/rechallenge—were all similarly unreliable.82 
 2. The Dose-Response Relationship 
Another reliable method for establishing causation is through evidence of the 
dose-response relationship, which is the “relationship in which a change in amount, 
intensity or duration of exposure to an agent is associated with a change—either an 
increase or decrease—in risk of disease.”83 In other words, an expert should be able 
to opine as to how much is too much. The Eleventh Circuit has held that the dose-
response relationship is the “hallmark of basic toxicology” and “the single most 
important factor to consider in evaluating whether an alleged exposure caused a 
specific adverse effect. . . . [An] expert who avoids or neglects this principle of 
toxic torts without justification casts suspicion on the reliability of his 
methodology.”84  
This principle was discussed at length in McClain v. Metabolife International, 
Inc., where the Eleventh Circuit found that an expert’s testimony was suspect and 
ultimately unreliable because the expert could not determine the dose of Metabolife 
required to injure the plaintiff or anyone else.85 The court observed that: 
Often low dose exposures—even for many years—will have no 
consequence at all, since the body is often able to completely 
 ________________________  
 76. See Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
549, 556–57 (3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter Reference Manual]. 
 77. Rider, 295 F.3d at 1198; see also Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
 78. See Rider, 295 F.3d at 1198. 
 79. Hendrix, 609 F.3d at 1196–97. 
 80. See Rider, 295 F.3d at 1198. 
 81. See id. at 1202. 
 82. See generally id. at 1199–201 (excluding the evidence as speculative, and the theory to be unreliable, 
because it did not support the hypothesis it was offered to prove). 
 83. McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1241–42 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Reference 
Manual, supra note 76, at 622). 
 84. Id. at 1242; see also Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1339 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 85. See McClain, 401 F.3d at 1241–43. 
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detoxify low doses before they do any damage. Furthermore, for 
most types of dose-response relationships following chronic 
(repeated) exposure, thresholds exist, such that there is some dose 
below which even repeated, long-term exposure would not cause 
an effect in any individual.86 
In McClain, however, the expert continually testified that any amount of 
Metabolife was dangerous, contradicting basic toxicological principles and thus 
casting doubt on his testimony.87 
3. Background Risk 
Yet another method for reliably establishing causation is through evidence of 
the background risk of the disease.88 This is the risk that members of the general 
public have of suffering the disease without exposure to the challenged product and 
the additional risk that those exposed to the product have of suffering the disease.89 
Without this information, it is difficult to determine whether any incidence of the 
disease is anything more than coincidence.90 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit has held 
that “a reliable methodology should take into account the background risk” and that 
in the absence of any evidence that exposure to the product causes additional risk 
of the disease, the court “must assume” that no such risk exists.91  
The court in McClain explained the usefulness of this methodology: 
[I]t would help to know how much additional risk for heart attack 
or ischemic stroke Metabolife consumers have over the risks the 
general population faces. If ephedrine or an ephedrine/caffeine 
combination do not increase the incidence of heart attack and 
ischemic stroke in persons who ingest it, as opposed to all those 
who do not and still have heart attacks and strokes, that fact would 
reduce the likelihood that Metabolife harmed Plaintiffs. Likewise, 
if Plaintiffs could show that taking Metabolife increases the risk of 
heart attack and ischemic stroke beyond the usual incidence of 
these common diseases, that would support their methodology in 
this case.92 
 ________________________  
 86. Id. at 1242 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 87. See id. at 1243. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. at 1244. 
 91. McClain, 401 F.3d at 1243–44; see also Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1342 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(concluding the expert’s failure to take into account background risk “place[s] the reliability of [his] conclusions in 
further doubt”). 
 92. McClain, 401 F.3d at 1244. 
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Plaintiffs’ experts admittedly did not know the background risk of the disease and, 
as a result, the court assumed it did not exist.93  
4. Physiological Mechanism 
Finally, “[a]n expert’s opinion will likely also survive Daubert if the expert 
described the physiological process, derived by the scientific method, by which a 
particular cause leads to the development of a given disease or syndrome.”94 The 
physiological or biological mechanism depends upon the existing state of the 
science as it involves “knowledge about the cellular and subcellular mechanisms 
through which the disease process works.”95 As discussed infra, animal studies 
suffer from a number of limitations, but they can be useful in demonstrating the 
physiological mechanism.96 The Eleventh Circuit has held that an expert who does 
not offer evidence of the physiological mechanism lacks one of “the underlying 
predicates of any cause-and-effect medical testimony.”97 Although the Eleventh 
Circuit has not addressed the notion of physiological mechanism at length, the 
Reference Manual suggests that in cases where the biology of a disease is not well 
understood, hypothesized physiological mechanisms may be accepted.98 
B. Scientifically Unreliable Methods for Establishing Causation  
Although no specific type of evidence is required to reliably prove general 
causation, the Eleventh Circuit has found that experts who failed to rely on any of 
the aforementioned types of evidence did not employ a reliable methodology in 
reaching their causation opinions.99 Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit recently stated that 
epidemiological studies, knowledge of the dose-response relationship, and 
background risk of the disease are methodologies that are “indispensable to 
proving the effect of an ingested substance.”100 In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit 
has explicitly foreclosed various types of evidence from reliably establishing 
 ________________________  
 93. See id. 
 94. Hendrix ex rel. G.P. v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1197 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 95. Reference Manual, supra note 76, at 605. 
 96. See id. at 563. 
 97. McClain, 401 F.3d at 1253 (quoting Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 314 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
 98. See Reference Manual, supra note 76, at 605.  
 99. See, e.g., Chapman v. Procter & Gamble Distrib., 766 F.3d 1296, 1308 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming the 
exclusion of causation testimony based on case reports, animal studies, FDA recommendations, and a differential 
diagnosis as unreliable); McClain, 401 F.3d at 1251, 1255 (affirming the exclusion of causation testimony based 
on chemical analogies, case reports, adverse event reports, FDA recommendations, dechallenge/rechallenge data, 
and a differential diagnosis as unreliable); Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1201–03 (11th Cir. 
2002) (affirming the exclusion of causation testimony based on case reports, dechallenge/rechallenge data, 
chemical analogies, animal studies, and FDA findings as unreliable); Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 
1336–40 (11th Cir. 2010) (affirming the exclusion of causation testimony based on case reports and case studies, 
literature reporting an association between the agent and the disease, animal studies, in-vitro studies, and a 
differential diagnosis as unreliable). 
 100. See, e.g., Chapman, 766 F.3d at 1308. 
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general causation—in many cases, the very same types of evidence the Florida 
Supreme Court had held acceptable under Frye.101  
1. Literature Reporting a Potential Association  
The Eleventh Circuit has held that “[s]howing an association is far removed 
from proving causation.”102 As defined by the Reference Manual, “[a]n association 
between exposure to an agent and a disease exists when they occur together more 
frequently than one would expect by chance.”103 Mere association, however, does 
not rise to the level of a causal relationship.104 Issues such as sampling errors, 
confounding, or bias can make it appear that an association exists.105 For these 
reasons, the court in Kilpatrick v. Breg noted, where “all of the articles [relied on 
by the plaintiff’s expert] merely stated potential associations . . . the literature [the 
plaintiff’s expert] based his conclusions upon was insufficient to create a reliable 
methodology which passes Daubert muster.”106  
This stands in stark contrast with Marsh and subsequent lower court decisions. 
Marsh held that even if subject to Frye, the expert testimony in that case was 
admissible simply because “numerous published articles and studies recognize an 
association between trauma and fibromyalgia.”107 The Fourth District reiterated 
this principle in Hood v. Matrixx, noting that a medical causation opinion is 
admissible so long as “the scientific literature recognizes an association or possible 
etiology between a medical condition and a predicate event.”108 
2. Causation Conclusions That Go Beyond the Conclusions Reached 
by Authors in the Field 
The Eleventh Circuit has held that an expert does not utilize a reliable 
methodology if he or she makes “unauthorized conclusions from limited data—
conclusions the authors of the study d[id] not make,” because that shows a “lack of 
scientific rigor.”109 As the McClain court explained, where the authors of published 
research “limit the conclusions authorized from their study by saying that it does 
not prove causation . . . [this] demonstrates the intellectual rigor in this field of 
science, an intellectual rigor that is conservative and does not leap to specific 
conclusions about causation or toxicity from incomplete evidence or broad 
 ________________________  
 101. See id. at 1311. 
 102. Kilpatrick, 613 F.3d at 1338 (quoting Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1315 n.16 (11th 
Cir. 1999)). 
 103. Reference Manual, supra note 76, at 566. 
 104. See id. 
 105. See id. at 568. 
 106. Kilpatrick, 613 F.3d at 1341. 
 107. Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 550 (Fla. 2007) (emphasis added). 
 108. Hood v. Matrixx Initiatives Inc., 50 So. 3d 1166, 1175 (Fla. 2010). 
 109. McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1248 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 145 (1997) (“Given that [the authors] were unwilling to say that PCB exposure had caused 
cancer among the workers they examined, their study did not support the expert’s conclusion that Joiner’s 
exposure to PCB’s causes his cancer.”). 
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principles.”110 Again, this is a significant departure from Florida Supreme Court 
precedent. In Marsh, all three studies on which the plaintiff’s expert relied 
concluded that more research was needed to determine whether trauma causes 
fibromyalgia, and that the existing data was insufficient to establish a causal 
relationship.111 Yet, the Marsh court held that this evidence was sufficient under 
Frye to the extent it applied, noting that “calls for further research do not preclude 
admission of the testimony.”112  
3. Case Reports and Adverse Event Reports 
The Eleventh Circuit has also made clear that general causation may not be 
inferred based solely on case reports or adverse event reports because “such studies 
lack control and thus do not provide as much information as controlled 
epidemiological studies do.”113 A case study is a medical account of a particular 
patient or group of patients, but it “reflect[s] only reported data, not scientific 
methodology. Some case reports are a very basic form report of symptoms with 
little or no patient history, description of course of treatment, or reasoning to 
exclude other possible causes.”114 As a result, “[c]ausal attribution based on case 
studies must be regarded with caution.”115 As the court in McClain held, “case 
reports raise questions, they do not answer them.”116 Similarly, adverse event 
reports are simply “uncontrolled anecdotal information that [offer] one of the least 
reliable sources to justify opinions about . . . causation.”117 This too appears to be 
inconsistent with the approach Florida courts have taken under Frye. As the dissent 
pointed out in Marsh, the majority of the articles suggesting an association in that 
case were “case reports and anecdotal accounts.”118 The same appears to be true of 
the published articles the expert relied on in Andries v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, 
Ltd.119 
4. Differential Diagnosis  
The Eleventh Circuit has explained that a differential diagnosis—i.e., a method 
whereby a physician identifies the cause of a plaintiff’s condition through the 
elimination of potential alternative causes—is used only after general causation is 
 ________________________  
 110. McClain, 401 F.3d at 1248. 
 111. See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 568. 
 112. Id. at 550. 
 113. Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1338 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 114. Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1199 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 115. Kilpatrick, 613 F.3d at 1338. 
 116. McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1254 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Hendrix ex rel. G.P. 
v. Evenflo Co., 609 F.3d 1183, 1197 (11th Cir. 2010) (case reports by themselves are “insufficient to show general 
causation”). 
 117. McClain, 401 F.3d at 1250. 
 118. Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 567 (Fla. 2007). 
 119. See Andries v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 12 So. 3d 260, 263 (Fla. 2009). 
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established; it is not a substitute for reliable proof of general causation.120 In other 
words, a differential diagnosis cannot “overcome the [plaintiffs’ experts’] 
fundamental failure to lay the scientific groundwork” for their causal theory 
through the application of scientifically valid methodologies.121  
Here too, Florida Supreme Court precedent has long held to the contrary, 
allowing for the admission of causation testimony simply if it is based on the 
generally accepted differential diagnosis technique. Specifically, in U.S. Sugar 
Corp., the Florida Supreme Court held that “there is no question that the 
differential diagnosis technique . . . is generally accepted in the scientific 
community” and thus it is not necessary that “the expert’s deductions based thereon 
and opinion also be generally accepted.”122 The Florida Supreme Court again 
emphasized this principle in Marsh, holding that differential diagnosis is not a new 
or novel scientific test subject to Frye.123 
5. Temporal Relationship 
In the same vein, courts in the Eleventh Circuit have held that a temporal 
relationship is not ordinarily sufficient to prove a causal relationship.124 A temporal 
relationship exists when a person is exposed to a substance and thereafter 
experiences injury.125 It is often the starting point for investigating the cause of an 
injury in clinical practice; but drawing a causation conclusion from this 
relationship “leads to the blunder of the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy.”126 This 
fallacy—literally translated to “after this, because of this”—assumes causality from 
a mere temporal sequence, and standing alone, “is entitled to little weight in 
determining causation.”127  
6. Unreliable Extrapolations  
As discussed in Section II(C) supra, Daubert requires that courts assess the 
basis for any extrapolations an expert makes in reaching his or her conclusions. In 
 ________________________  
 120. See Chapman v. Procter & Gamble Distrib., 766 F.3d 1296, 1308 (11th Cir. 2014); Hendrix, 609 F.3d 
at 1202 (holding that differential analysis could not prove that traumatic brain injury caused plaintiff’s autism 
because experts did not first prove that traumatic injury can, in general, cause autism); Kilpatrick, 613 F.3d at 
1342 (differential diagnosis “assumes the existence of general causation”). 
 121. Hendrix, 609 F.3d at 1195. Indeed, an expert’s application of the differential diagnosis method does 
not, by itself, even render a specific causation opinion reliable. Rather, “the reliability of the method must be 
judged by considering the reasonableness of applying the differential etiology approach to the facts of this case 
and the validity of the experts’ particular method of analyzing the data and drawing conclusions therefrom.” Id. 
 122. U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So. 2d 110, 110 (Fla. 2002); see also Gelsthorpe v. Weinstein, 897 
So. 2d 504, 510–11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that “the use of the technique differential diagnosis by an 
expert medical witness in determining causation does not raise concerns under Frye. Differential diagnosis is an 
established scientific methodology . . . [that] is generally accepted in the scientific community.”). 
 123. See Marsh, 977 So. 2d at 549. 
 124. See McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1243 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 125. See Craig T. Smith, Peering into the Microscope: The Rise of Judicial Gatekeeping After Daubert and 
its Effect on Federal Toxic Tort Litigation, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 218, 242 (2007). 
 126. McClain, 401 F.3d at 1243. 
 127. Id. at 1254. 
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light of that mandate, the Eleventh Circuit has routinely excluded medical 
causation opinions based on unsupported extrapolations.128 For instance, the 
Eleventh Circuit has rejected extrapolations from: (a) studies regarding different 
substances;129 (b) studies regarding different diseases;130 (c) animal studies;131 and 
(d) in-vitro studies.132 While these types of data are not per se invalid, an expert 
cannot simply presume they are sufficient without providing a scientifically 
reliable basis for his or her extrapolations. In particular, relying on animal and in-
vitro studies in a reliable manner under Daubert requires that the expert 
demonstrate how the test results would transfer to a human subject.133 In contrast, 
unexplained extrapolations from these types of data were held to be sufficient 
under Florida’s application of Frye, as extrapolation was considered a “commonly 
accepted methodology,” the basis of which courts were prohibited from 
assessing.134 
7. Weight of the Evidence 
Although the Eleventh Circuit has yet to address the reliability of the so-called 
“weight of the evidence” or “totality of the evidence” methodology, it bears 
mentioning in this article because plaintiffs in toxic tort cases have begun to 
routinely rely on this approach in the absence of any of the aforementioned reliable 
methodologies. Specifically, weight of the evidence is a methodology employed by 
regulatory and advisory agencies in conducting risk assessment analyses.135 At its 
most basic, it is an analysis as to whether, in the “aggregate,” the evidence cited by 
the expert “presents a stronger scientific basis” for finding causation than when the 
 ________________________  
 128. See FEDERAL MOTIONS IN LIMINE § 5:7 (2014). 
 129. See McClain, 401 F.3d at 1246 (finding that the expert improperly relied on extrapolations from studies 
regarding different drugs in the same class because “even minor deviations in chemical structure can radically 
change a particular substance’s properties and propensities” and the expert had “failed to show that the [drug] 
analogy is valid or that differences in chemical structure . . . make no difference”). 
 130. See Rider v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1202 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that the plaintiff’s 
experts’ extrapolations from evidence regarding a different disease than the one at issue were an unsupported “leap 
of faith”). 
 131. See id. (holding that the expert could not reliably extrapolate the results of animal studies to humans 
because “what happens in an animal would not necessarily happen in a human being” and the plaintiffs had not 
offered a rationale that, in the context of what was being studied, animals and humans were sufficiently similar to 
justify the extrapolation). 
 132. See Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1341 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that experts cannot 
extrapolate from the results of in-vitro studies unless the expert can “state how their test results would transfer 
when conducted on live human subjects”). 
 133. See id.; see also Rider, 295 F.3d at 1202. 
 134. Castillo v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 854 So. 2d 1264, 1278 (Fla. 2003). 
 135. See, e.g., Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 198 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that “weight of the 
evidence” is a method used by “[r]egulatory and advisory bodies such as IARC, OSHA and EPA . . . to assess the 
carcinogenicity of various substances in human beings and suggest or make prophylactic rules governing human 
exposure”); Magistrini v. One Hour Martinizing Dry Cleaning, 180 F. Supp. 2d 584, 602 (D.N.J. 2002) (noting 
that “weight of the evidence” is a methodology “recognized by the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency as well as the Internal Agency for Research of Cancer,” in which “the quality and adequacy of the data 
and the kinds and consistency of responses induced by a suspected carcinogen” are considered).  
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evidence is considered individually.136 The Middle District of Florida has described 
the method as “reviewing the totality of the literature . . . including studies in which 
the authors found no evidence of a causal connection,” then “appl[ying] a 
generally-accepted set of guidelines to the evidence,” and finally “arriving at [the] 
conclusion that the weight of the evidence support[s] a causal connection.”137 
Courts have grappled with the “weight of the evidence” methodology. It is an 
amorphous concept and, in employing this approach, “reasonable scientists may 
come to different judgments about whether such an inference [of causation] is 
appropriate.”138 Despite this limitation, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in 
Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc., held that “weight of the 
evidence” can be “a scientifically sound and methodologically reliable foundation” 
for a causation opinion and that the admissibility of such an opinion “must turn on 
the particular facts of the case.”139 In Milward, the plaintiff’s expert utilized 
“weight of the evidence” to establish that benzene caused a rare leukemia.140 In 
doing so, the expert relied on a large body of reliable evidence to form his 
causation opinion, such as epidemiological studies, case-control studies, and near 
consensus among governmental agencies.141 
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has rejected this 
methodology as per se unreliable because it requires a threshold that is too low for 
judicial use.142 In Allen v. Pennsylvania Engineering, Corp., the court rejected the 
use of the weight of the evidence methodology to demonstrate a link between a 
chemical, known as ethylene oxide, and brain cancer because, at bottom, the 
experts had relied on epidemiological evidence that was merely suggestive of 
causation but not statistically significant.143 The experts thus could not circumvent 
the frailties of their scientific evidence by simply aggregating unreliable pieces of 
evidence.144 Both the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have also rejected the use of this 
methodology for similar reasons.145 Given the Eleventh Circuit’s particularly 
rigorous scrutiny of causation expert testimony, we suspect that if presented with 
the question, they will follow the approach adopted by the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits. 
 ________________________  
 136. Glastetter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 992 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Caraker v. Sandoz 
Pharm. Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1040 (S.D. Ill. 2001) (“Whether, in aggregate, the evidence cited supported 
an inference that would enable plaintiffs’ experts to offer an admissible causation opinion.”). 
 137. In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:06-MD-1769-ORL-22D, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15653, at 
*159 (M.D. Fla. June 23, 2009). 
 138. Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 139. Id. at 17. 
 140. Id. at 17–20. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See Allen v. Pa. Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 143. See id. at 196–98. 
 144. See id. at 198. 
 145. See Hollander v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193, 1216 n.21 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
“weight of the evidence” methodology is “inconsistent with Daubert. To suggest that those individual categories 
of evidence deemed unreliable by the district court may be added to form a reliable theory would be to abandon 
the level of intellectual rigor of the expert in the field.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Glastetter v. Novartis 
Pharm. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 992 (8th Cir. 2001) (rejecting expert testimony that relied on case reports, medical 
treatises, a handful of human “rechallenge” and “dechallenge” events, dissimilar animal studies, internal company 
documents, and FDA recommendations). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Regardless of whether Florida state courts look to Eleventh Circuit case law for 
guidance in applying Daubert, it is clear that Daubert and its progeny will 
themselves usher in a “brave new world” for litigants who rely on medical 
causation testimony. The principles expressed by the Eleventh Circuit in the 
context of medical causation cases only further manifest the new landscape that 
Florida litigants are facing under Daubert. Indeed, while the regime of Frye has 
rendered Florida judges extremely limited in their ability to keep junk science and 
unreliable expert testimony out of the courtroom, the amendments to Florida 
Statute section 90.702 now compel far more scrutiny of medical causation 
testimony than has ever been the case. As the Eleventh Circuit explained in Allison, 
“[w]hile meticulous Daubert inquiries may bring judges under criticism for 
donning white coats and making determinations that are outside their field of 
expertise, the Supreme Court has obviously deemed this less objectionable than 
dumping a barrage of questionable scientific evidence on a jury.”146 
Attorneys around the state should be prepared for these imminent changes. 
Expert testimony can make or break any type of case requiring proof of medical 
causation—such as a products liability or toxic tort litigation. Indeed, not only do 
juries place a great deal of reliance on expert witnesses in cases such as these, but 
plaintiffs are unlikely to even get to a jury in the first place without offering 
admissible expert witness testimony as to causation.147 As a result, the transition to 
Daubert will likely bring a significant increase in the number of challenges made 
to medical causation experts, and that has the potential to impact the success that 
plaintiffs experience in litigating these types of cases. 
 
 ________________________  
 146. Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 147. See, e.g., Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 545 (Fla. 2007) (holding that the admissibility of expert 
testimony was the determining issue as to whether the defendant was entitled to the entry of summary judgment). 
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